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ENDING MALE PRIVILEGE: BEYOND IBE
REASONABLE WOMAN

Stephanie M. Wildman*
A LAW OF HER OWN: THE REASONABLE WOMAN AS A MEASURE
OF MAN. By Caroline A. Fore!! and Donna M. Matthews. New York:

New York University Press. 2000. Pp. xxii, 260. $35.

A Law of Her Own: The Reasonable Woman as a Measure of Man
by Caroline A. Forell1 and Donna M. Matthews2 aspires to provide a
solution for an enigmatic jurisprudential problem - the systemic fail
ure of the legal order to recognize and to redress the injuries that
women experience. Feminist scholars have agreed that, for women,
the legal separation of public and private spheres often insulates from
legal review behavior that harms women.3 But even in the so-called
public sphere, women suffer harms that remain invisible and un
named.4 The authors identify four legal arenas in which the "spectrum
of violence and disregard of women is most evident and problematic"
(p. xviii) : the areas of sexual harassment, stalking, domestic homicide,
and rape. To make the legal system responsive to women's experi
ences the authors propose applying a " 'reasonable woman' standard
to the conduct of men in certain legal settings - where men's and
* Copyright © 2000, Stephanie M Wildman, Visiting Professor of Law and Director,
Center for Social Justice at Boalt Hall, University of California at Berkeley; Professor of
Law, Emerita, University of San Francisco School of Law. A.B. 1970; J.D. 1973, Stanford
University. - Ed. Thanks to Margalynne Armstrong, Donna Coker, Bryan Ford, Angela
Harris, Martha Mahoney, Lee Ryan, and Catharine Wells for helpful insights and continued
support of my work. Special appreciation to Sonya Smallets for outstanding research assis
tance and commentary.

1. Professor of Law, University of Oregon.
2. Attorney, private practice in Oregon.
3. See infra note 31 and accompanying text
4. One recent exception to the definition of harms to women as private and immune
from legal intervention has been the development of the law of sexual harassment. Federal
law now recognizes workplace behavior, long accepted by women as "the way things are," as
a violation of federal civil rights. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
See also, CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN
(1979); Cynthia Grant Bowman, Street Harassment and the Informal Ghettoization of
Women, 106 HARV. L. REV. 517 (1993). Recent interesting tort scholarship has discussed
the gendered nature of harm in relation to torts like the negligent infliction of emotional dis
tress, developed to remedy harms women suffered. See Martha Chamallas & Linda Kerber,
Women, Mothers and the Law of Fright: A History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814 (1990); see also
THE PASSIONS OF LAw (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999) (considering the "role that emotions
play, don't play, and ought to play in the practice and conception of law and justice.").
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women's life experiences and views on sex and aggression diverge and
women are overwhelmingly the injured parties" (p. xvii). The authors
argue that by applying the standard of a reasonable woman in each of
these areas - that is by making woman the measure of man - the le
gal system will be forced to recognize women's perspectives. They de
fine the reasonable woman as one who wants and demands "respect,
personal autonomy, agency, and bodily integrity" (p. xix), and they
elaborate that "behavior violating these aspects of woman's humanity
is legally unacceptable" (p. xix).
The idea of recognizing the harms women suffer and eliciting re
gard, respect, and empathy for women in these situations is an impor
tant and appealing goal.5 The use of a reasonable woman standard
will not be as effective a means of achieving this goal as actually nam
ing the harms that women suffer and revealing the patriarchal system
that maintains the invisibility of those harms. Furthermore, Forell and
Matthews' proposal to use a reasonable woman standard implicates
two fundamental problems that have plagued feminist thinkers: the
"sameness/difference" equality problem and the essentialism problem.
Although Forell and Matthews acknowledge these issues,6 their solu
tion - looking to a reasonable woman standard - does not ade
quately address them because it fails to name the power dynamic that
initially creates the problems. Using a reasonable woman standard
implicitly accepts the fundamental notion of legal liberalism that all
members of society are equally-situated, autonomous actors, albeit
with different perspectives. By failing to address the systems of privi
lege that maintain the sex-based, gendered status quo, the reasonable
woman standard cannot go far enough to ensure that the legal system
will recognize women's harms.7

5. The idea of the reasonable woman having a different view of facts and culpability,
particularly in the criminal context, received popular attention in Susan Glaspell's short
story, A Jury ofher Peers. The story describes a woman arrested following the death of her
husband. The male law enforcement officers see a clear-cut case of homicide. The women
who accompany the officers to the crime scene see a darker tale of domestic hardship and
abuse. Their identification with the perspective of the arrested woman defendant underlines
the critical importance of perspective in evaluating human actions - the need for a jury of
her peers. See Marina Angel, Criminal Law and Women: Giving the Abused Woman Who
Kills A Jury of Her Peers Who Appreciate Trifles, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 229 (1996) (dis
cussing Glaspell's story as a vehicle for teaching and the idea of diverse perspectives it
raises); Patricia L. Bryan, Stories in Fiction and in Fact: Susan Glaspell's a Jury ofHer Peers
and the 1901 Murder Trial of Margaret Hossack, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1293 (1997) {addressing
the biases and assumptions that shape the narratives told in the courtroom).
6. Chapter 2, "The Meaning of Equality," discusses these subjects. Pp. 8-19.
7. Another debate in feminist theory concerns the use of the term "gender" or the term
"sex" to describe disadvantaging treatment of women. "Gender" advocates emphasize the
cultural conditioning surrounding women's oppression. Those who urge the use of "sex"
often highlight the role of biological difference. This essay uses "sex" and "gender" inter
changeably because both biology and culture contribute to the system of power that privi
leges maleness. For a more complete discussion of the "sex" and "gender" debate, see
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THE ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF A REASONABLE
WOMAN STANDARD

Forell and Matthews correctly identify the areas of sexual harass
ment, stalking, domestic homicide, and rape as spheres in which harms
against women have long been ignored and are often still misunder
stood by the legal system. One of the strengths of this book is the
authors' ability to powerfully explain and provide examples of the
problems women face. The legal system is not responsive to women's
life experience in these four highlighted areas. Forell and Matthews
believe that the use of a reasonable woman standard will serve to cor
rect that systemic nonresponsiveness.8
The authors begin in the area of sexual harassment, by reviewing
the evolution of legal doctrine and relating the important educational
function of the Clarence Thomas Senate confirmation hearings, in
which Anita Hill described the work environment created by the
Supreme Court nominee (p. 24). The authors next report a series of
cases and urge that the application of the reasonable woman standard
would result in the correct decision. According to the authors, the
proper result could be achieved by ensuring that a court would look at
the workplace conduct through the eyes of the woman employee com
plaining of the harassment.9 The many cases in which courts and the
Stephanie Riger, Rethinking the Distinction Between Sex and Gender, in POWER, PRIVILEGE
AND LAW: A CML RIGHTS READER 232 (Leslie Bender & Daan Braveman eds., 1995).
8. Several landmark articles have discussed the utility of a reasonable woman standard,
while not advocating its adoption. See Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the
Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183 (1989) (arguing that sexual
harassment claims should be cognizable as long as the harasser engaged in sexually oriented
behavior and the victim experienced feelings of coercion or devaluation); Naomi R. Cahn,
The Looseness ofLegal Language: The Reasonable Woman Standard in Theory and Prac
tice, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398 (1992) (rejecting the reasonable woman standard as not able
to address the diversity of women's experiences); Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and
Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE LJ.
1177 (1990) (rejecting the reasonable woman standard, as well as the reasonable person
standard, as relying on false ideas about objectivity and social consensus with the effect of
supporting the status quo of subordination).
9. For articles advocating the use of the reasonable woman standard in sexual harass
ment cases, see Deborah S. Brenneman, From A Woman's Point of View: The Use of the
Reasonable Woman Standard in Sexual Harassment Cases, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 1281, 1305-06
(1992) (urging that a reasonable woman standard is necessary in order to adequately address
the problem of sexual harassment since men and women have divergent views on acceptable
workplace behavior); Lynn Dennison, An Argument for the Reasonable Woman Standard in
Hostile Environment Claims, 54 Omo ST. LJ. 473, 495-96 (1993) (arguing that the reason
able woman standard should be used to evaluate sexual harassment claims because it recog
nizes and gives validity to more diversity of perspective than the reasonable person standard
does); Caroline Forell, Essentialism, Empathy, and the Reasonable Woman, 1994 U. ILL. L.
REV. 769, 776 (contending that the reasonable woman standard should be used to evaluate
the defendant's conduct in civil cases, including sexual harassment, in which "the perceptions
of men and women differ as the existence and seriousness of the harmful conduct");
Elizabeth A. Glidden, The Emergence ofthe Reasonable Woman in Combating Hostile Envi
ronment Sexual Harassment, 77 IOWA L. REV. 1825, 1829 (1992) (advocating the adoption of
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public do not recognize the sexual harassment that women experience
at work as a harm show that the authors are correct in identifying this
area as one in which experiences differ and a woman's perspective is
often not regarded as legitimate.
Stalking is another area in which the legal system has only rela
tively recently recognized a specific legal harm.10 As the authors ex
plain: "The law's inaction on stalking exemplifies how the male
biased legal system values the male stalkers' freedom of action and
speech over the female targets' security and emotional well-being" (p.
126). Deploring the use of stalking as a scenario for humor in recent
films like There's Something About Mary, Porell and Matthews em
phasize that stalking is far from flattering or fun (p. 128). The authors
perceptively explain that stalking is part of a pattern of gendered vio
lence against women.11 Here again, the authors urge that use of the
standard of a reasonable woman will ensure that stalkers will be
prosecuted.12
a reasonable woman standard in order to combat sexual harassment, particularly as of means
of promoting "greater employer consciousness in discovering and rectifying sexual harass
ment problems"); David I. Pinkston, Redefining Objectivity: The Case for the Reasonable
Woman Standard in Hostile Environment Claims, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 363, 364 (advocating
the reasonable woman standard because it "more fully achieves the purposes of Title VII by
better protecting female employees, reducing sexual harassment, and ensuring an objective,
fair standard upon which employers and employees can rely"). But see, Anita Bernstein,
Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 445, 454 (1997) (urging that
"reasonableness cannot anchor sexual harassment law"); Katherine M. Franke, What's
Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691, 750 (1997) (contending the reason
able woman standard resolves sex-based bias at the price of enforcing gender stereotypes).
10. In 1990, California became the first state to make stalking a crime. See p. 126. The
authors' discussion here illustrates one difficulty in using this book. This writer would be the
first to object to the culture of legal writing that relegates its most salient points to footnotes,
such as the infamous note 20 in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 497 (1974), which says
treating individuals differently on account of pregnancy is not sex discrimination, or the well
known Carotene Products footnote, emphasizing the protection of "discrete and insular mi
norities," 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). Nonetheless, the lack of footnotes in this book is dis
tracting for the legal researcher, who would benefit from having a citation to the stalking
statute. The lay reader, however, is unlikely to seek the statute and may well appreciate the
flow of the text without footnotes.
11. As for its potential application to legal studies, this stalking chapter could provide a
useful primer on the underlying gender issues for a torts or criminal law course. Many pro
fessors leave examination of gendered harms, such as stalking, out of their courses in the in
terest of "bar coverage." See Joan Howarth, Remarks at the Society of American Law
Teacher's Robert Cover Study Group, AALS annual meeting, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 6,
2000). One response to this problem has been to urge bar examiners to test in these subject
areas. Texas and Florida have included questions on domestic violence on their state bar
examinations. See Remarks of Sarah M. Buel (University of Texas School of Law), ABA
Conference on Domestic Violence, Berkeley, California (Feb. 18, 2000). Inclusion of gen
dered harm is important, but it must not be done in a sensationalized manner that under
mines the test-taking ability of bar applicants who have had personal experience with these
issues. See, for example, the discussion of law school examinations that stereotype and gen
erate trauma in PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF
A LAW PROFESSOR 80-94 (1991).
12. On the adoption of the reasonable woman standard in the area of stalking, see Lisa
Nolen Birmingham, Note, Closing the Loophole: Vermont's Legislative Response to Stalk-
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Addressing the issue of domestic homicide, Forell and Matthews
recognize that these crimes involve men trying to control women and
"women struggl[ing] to resist coercion and maintain their choices."13
This characterization of domestic homicide embodies an implicit hier
archy in which men are the more powerful actors. Women are not the
equal and independent actors that liberal legal ideology posits; women
seek to resist men's efforts at control in a context in which men are
more powerful. As the authors explain: "For men, the law generally
treats violence against an intimate as more permissible than violence
against an acquaintance or a stranger" (p. 163). Many women are
simply not safe at home. When a woman reacts to the violence perpe
trated by an intimate, the law often blames her, sympathizing with the
man (p. 163). The authors criticize the law of provocation, which miti
gates a first or second degree murder charge,14 and urge applying the
standard of behavior of a reasonable woman to the male killer's be
havior. They contend that asking whether a reasonable woman would
have "become enraged, lost control, and killed . . . would drastically
limit legally condoned domestic violence and passion/provocation
ing, 18 VT. L. REV. 477, 521-23 (1994) (arguing that courts applying anti-stalking statutes
should use a reasonable woman standard when determining whether the stalker's conduct is
sufficiently severe to violate the law).
13. P. 157 (quoting R. Emerson Dobash & Russell P. Dobash, Violence against Women,
in GENDER VIOLENCE: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES (Laura L. O'Toole & Jessica
R. Schiffman eds., 1997)).
14. The following California jury instruction explains how provocation serves to miti
gate a murder charge:
CALlIC 8.42 SUDDEN QUARREL OR HEAT OF PASSION AND PROVOCATION
EXPLAINED (PEN. CODE, § 192, SUBD.(A))
To reduce an intentional felonious homicide from the offense of murder to manslaughter
upon the ground of sudden quarrel or heat of passion, the provocation must be of the char
acter and degree as naturally would excite and arouse the passion, and the assailant must act
under the influence of that sudden quarrel or heat of passion.
The heat of passion which will reduce a homicide to manslaughter must be such a passion
as naturally would be aroused in the mind of an ordinarily reasonable person in the same
circumstances. A defendant is not permitted to set up [his] [her] own standard of conduct
and to justify or excuse [himself] [herself] because [his] [her] passions were aroused unless
the circumstances in which the defendant was placed and the facts that confronted [him]
[her] were such as also would have aroused the passion of the ordinarily reasonable person
faced with the same situation. [Legally adequate provocation may occur in a short, or over a
considerable, period of time.]
The question to be answered is whether or not, at the time of the killing, the reason of
the accused was obscured or disturbed by passion to such an extent as would cause the ordi
narily reasonable person of average disposition to act rashly and without deliberation and
reflection, and from passion rather than from judgment.
If there was provocation, [whether of short or long duration,] but of a nature not nor
mally sufficient to arouse passion, or if sufficient time elapsed between the provocation and
the fatal blow for passion to subside and reason to return, and if an unlawful killing of a hu
man being followed the provocation and had all the elements of murder, as I have defined it,
the mere fact of slight or remote provocation will not reduce the offense to manslaughter.
1 THE COMMITTEE ON STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL, OF THE SUPERIOR

COURT OF Los ANGELES COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS CRIMINAL § 842 (6th ed. 1996).
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homicide" (p. 172). The authors also outline the problems with the
traditional law of self-defense faced by battered women who kill.
Here, however, improvement is slowly showing, and the authors ac
knowledge that in some jurisdictions "the legal system is starting to get
it right" by accepting the serious implications of domestic violence.15
In the area of rape, Farell and Matthews review the long-standing
stereotypes that female rape victims must combat: "women want to be
seduced and to have their verl;Jal and physical resistance overcome;
women's behavior and clothing indicate willingness to engage in sex
ual intercourse; and women don't tell the truth about sex" (pp. 22223). In this male-defined world in which "no" does not mean "no,'' a
woman's consent to sexual intercourse serves as a defense to a charge
of rape. The authors acknowledge a debt to Susan Estrich's landmark
work on rape law's validation of the male perspective, particularly in
the field of acquaintance rape.16 Catharine MacKinnon, discussing the
prevalence of unprosecuted rapes and acquittals in cases in which rape
is charged, has taken this criticism a step further, explaining that under
this legal regime rape is effectively allowed.17 Farell and Matthews
urge the reasonable woman standard as the remedy, holding men "to
the standard of how women would like men to behave."18
Having explored the inadequacies of the legal system in these four
areas that affect women's lives, Farell and Matthews offer a self
proclaimed "radical" solution (p. 241). In an effort to remedy these
grave inadequacies and to compel the legal system to take seriously
the harms that women suffer, they propose applying a "reasonable
woman" standard to men's conduct in these situations. Where men's
and women's life experiences and views are so different and it is
women who are "overwhelmingly the injured parties" (p. xvii), the
M

15. P. 214. For a discussion of the reasonable woman standard in the domestic homi
cide/self-defense area, see Holly Maguigan, Battered Woman and Self-Defense: Myths and
Misconceptions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379 (1991) (arguing that
existing criminal doctrine can accommodate the self-defense claims of women who kill their
abusers, but it is being misapplied by judges). For an article urging the adoption of the stan
dard, see Kim Lane Scheppele, The Reasonable Woman, THE REsPONSIVE COMMUNITY,
Fall 1991, at 36 (advocating the adoption of a separate reasonableness standard for women
who kill their abusers).
16. See pp. 223-24 (referring to SUSAN EsTRICH, REAL RAPE (1987) and Susan Estrich,
Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087 (1986)).
17. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE
145-46 (1989). MacKinnon observes that "the systemic failure of the state to enforce the
rape law effectively or at all excludes women from equal access to justice." Id. at 245-46.
18. P. 223; see also Mary Ruffolo Rauch, Rape - From A Woman's Perspective, 82 ILL.
B.J. 614, 618 (1994) (arguing that courts apply a reasonable woman standard when deter
mining if a man used force or the threat of force to coerce a woman into having sex with
him). But see Catharine Pierce Wells, Date Rape and the Law: Another Feminist View, in
DATE RAPE: FEMINISM, PHILOSOPHY, AND THE LAW 41 (Leslie Francis ed., 1996) (con
tending that adopting a woman's point of view forces patterns of passivity and noncommuni
cation that are the essence of victimhood).

May 2000]

Ending Male Privilege

1803

authors reason that this "deliberate use of the reasonable woman
standard in areas involving sex, sexism, and aggression, with careful
explanation of what the standard means, will elicit greater empathy for
women's experiences from society in general and from legal decision
makers in particular" (p. xix). Farell and Matthews define a reason
able woman as someone requiring "respect, personal autonomy,
agency, and bodily integrity" (p. xix). According to the authors:
a reasonable woman would be more likely to experience pornography
and degrading treatment in the workplace as sexual harassment and con
sider no to mean no when sex is involved. She would also likely view
killing a domestic partner who leaves or gets involved with someone else
as murder and killing one's batterer out of fear of severe injury or death
as self-defense. [p. 18]

II. THE REASONABLE WOMAN FACING SEXUAL HARASSMENT
AND STALKING
In the field of sexual harassment the authors describe a series of
cases involving the open discussion of graphic sexual stories,19 display
of pornographic pictures,20 and prevalence of pin-up calendars.21 Re
lating the facts in Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards,22 the authors ex
plain:
[t]hese sexually explicit and degrading images included "a picture of a
woman's pubic area with a meat spatula pressed on it, observed on a wall
next to the sheetmetal shop"; "a picture of a nude Black woman, pubic
area exposed to reveal her labia, seen in a public locker room"; "draw
ings and graffiti on the walls including a drawing depicting a frontal view
of a nude female torso with the words 'USDA Choice' written on it . . . in
an area where Robinson was assigned to work"; and "a dart board with a
drawing of a woman's breast with her nipple as the bull's eye." [p. 45]

Surely this is conduct that a reasonable man or woman might find of
fensive in a work environment. The employer conducted a defense
suggesting that the female plaintiff was "extrasensitive about sexually
offensive conduct" (p. 54). The employer further presented testimony
from a female employee who said "pictorial displays of naked women
did not offend her, and she suggested that Robinson 'was spending too
much time attending to the pictures and not enough time attending to
her job' " (p. 54). This testimony by a female co-employee demon
strates the difficulty with using a reasonable woman standard; the em-

19. See pp. 24-25 (using the Hill/Thomas confirmation hearings as an example).
20. P. 35; see also Rabidue v. Osceola, 805 F. 2d 611, 615, 623-24 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding
that a reasonable person would not find that sexually oriented posters in the workplace cre
ate a hostile work environment).
21. See Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1493-98 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
22 Id.

1804

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 98:1797

ployer urges that this woman who is not upset by her coworkers' be
havior is the reasonable one. The authors explain that this woman
undoubtedly wanted to keep her "high-paying job" (p. 54) and there
fore denied the "negative effects of the hostile environment" (p. 54).
The authors correctly explain that Robinson highlights how differ
ently men and women may view their work environments, but here
even women perceived the environment differently from each other.
Porell and Matthews assert that the use of the reasonable woman
standard in this case led to the correct result - the plaintiff prevailed
on her hostile work environment claim. But it is unclear, where
women themselves disagree, why the reasonable woman standard
would always (or even often) lead to the vindication of women who
complain about sexual harassment. Even the successful Robinson
plaintiff was denied monetary damages by the court, which did afford
her injunctive relief.
In the area of stalking, Porell and Matthews urge that a reasonable
woman standard should be applied to the stalker's conduct to ensure
that the legal determination as to whether the stalker's behavior mer
its legal intervention will reflect women's notions of fear, not men's.
The authors explain that attitudes toward stalking are gendered, that
"this kind of conduct rarely happens to men, and [that] when it does,
it's usually annoying, not terrifying" (p. 126). Most state statutes re
quire as a threshold for legal intervention that the stalker's behavior
pose a "credible threat" of harm.23 Porell and Matthews believe that,
by applying the reasonable woman standard and asking whether the
conduct would make a reasonable woman fearful, the legal system will
ensure that the stalker's behavior is evaluated from the perspective of
those individuals the law seeks to protect. "[R]easonable women are
likely to experience fear in situations where reasonable men would
not" (p. 133). The authors elaborate: "It is reasonable for a woman to
be frightened when she experiences repeated and unwelcome visual,
verbal, or written contact that indicates sexual interest or anger at re
jection. Because, in the context of stalking, fear is gendered, stalking
statutes need to explicitly take this into account" (p. 135). Ironically,
the author's critique of stalking statutes' failure to value expressly a
female perspective demonstrates why a reasonable woman standard is
not the best method for achieving the goal of recognizing the harm
women suffer. Instead of drafting statutes using vague language of
reasonableness, legislatures should name the conduct that is objec
tionable.24 Conduct that induces fear in a reasonable woman, "re23. P. 129. For examples of stalking statues, see Robert P. Faulkner & Douglas H.
Hsiao, And Where You Go I'll Follow: The Constitutionality ofAntista/king Laws and Pro
posed Model Legislation, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 2 & n.3 (1994) (reporting that 43 states
have stalking statutes).

24. See id. at 52 (proposing model anti-stalking legislation). While this proposed legisla
tion uses "reasonableness" language, it also details objectionable conduct. See id.
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peated and unwelcome visual, verbal, or written contact that indicates
sexual interest or anger at rejection" (p. 135), could be targeted di
rectly by lawmakers without a need to resort to the vagaries of rea
sonableness, gendered or otherwise.
III. THE SYSTEM OF MALE PRMLEGE

The conduct described as stalking and the notion that women in
the workplace are sexual objects both result directly from a system of
male privilege. Systems of privilege are "elusive and fugitive,"25 de
riving their power from their very invisibility. Privilege defines the so
cietal norm and measure for us all,26 yet, because each system is hard
to see, and because systems of privilege interact to reinforce them
selves, the power of privilege remains difficult to erode. MacKinnon
offers perhaps the most complete description of the system of male
privilege that defines vital aspects of American life from a male point
of view:
Men's physiology defines most sports, their health needs largely define
insurance coverage, their socially designed biographies define workplace
expectations and successful career patterns, their perspectives and con
cerns define quality in scholarship, their experiences and obsessions de
fine merit, their military service defines citizenship, their presence de
fines family, their inability to get along with each other - their wars and
rulerships - define history, their image defines god, and their genitals
define sex.27

MacKinnon's examples articulate the male tilt that is present in
seemingly neutral ideas and words that define society as we know it.28
Rarely do we question "the way things are."29
Male privilege and entitlement, which derive from early notions of
women as the property of their fathers and husbands, remain as a ves
tige of that history in stalking behavior by men. The authors recognize
that a connection exists between stalking, sexual harassment, and do
mestic homicide. They examine two sexual harassment cases that in25. Stephanie M. Wildman with Adrienne D. Davis, Making Systems of Privilege Visi
ble, in STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN WITH CONTRIBUTIONS BY MARGALYNNE ARMSTRONG,
ADRIENNE D. DAVIS & TRINA GRILLO, PRIVILEGE REVEALED: How INVISIBLE
PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA 7, 17 (1996) (citing Peggy Mcintosh's classic descrip
tion of the system of white privilege).
26. See id. at 15.
27. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 224
(1989).
28. See id.; see also Stephanie M. Wildman, Privilege in the Workplace - The Missing
Element in Antidiscrimination Law, in PRIVILEGE REVEALED, supra note 25, at 25-30 (dis
cussing the normalization of male privilege in the workplace).
29. Wildman with Davis, supra note 25, at 17 ("Privilege is not visible to its holder; it is
merely there, a part of the world, a way of life, simply the way things are.").
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volved stalking (pp. 138-48) and cases where the stalking of former in
timates resulted in homicide (pp. 149-54). Rather than relying on use
of a reasonable woman standard, a privilege analysis names and rec
ognizes that continuum of gendered violence. Advocates of the rea
sonable woman standard may reject a privilege analysis. Indeed, the
authors might answer that because the legal system, and indeed soci
ety, is imbued in that system of male privilege, the male behaviors are
not named or recognized as terrifying. The authors might urge that a
reasonable woman standard is required to highlight a different view of
these behaviors, which are ordinarily seen as the "way things are."
While it is true that those with privilege rarely recognize it as such,30
the failure to identify and name privilege as systemic merely perpetu
ates its existence. Focusing on reasonable women and engaging in the
debate over whether to use an ungendered or gendered "objective"
standard to measure behavior steers the discussion away from the
heart of the matter. Using a gendered standard may achieve some vic
tories that combat systems of privilege, but it can only do so by indi
rection, leaving the system of male privilege intact.
IV.

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND RAPE: OF REASONABLE WOMEN
AND MALE PRIVILEGE

Domestic violence is another site at which law has permitted male
privilege to be maintained through nonintervention in the domestic
sphere - a sphere labeled as "private." Leading feminist scholars31
have documented the poverty of this public/private distinction, which
leaves women unprotected in the so-called private realm. Forell and
Matthews recognize that the interaction of the criminal law doctrines
of self-defense32 and heat of passion/provocation in the area of domes30. See Wildman with Davis, supra note 25, at 17.
31. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV 973 (1991)
(arguing that the denial of the prevalence of battering sustains and legitimates its power); see
also LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES: THE PoLmCS AND HISTORY OF
FAMILY VIOLENCE 288 (1988) (explaining how family violence has been historically and po
litically constructed: "Men's violence against some women . . . reinforces all women's subor
dination and all men's domini>nce."); Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Pub/idPrivate Dis
tinction, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1992) (arguing that the public/private distinction suggests that
there are natural categories for ordering society, masking political decisions about how to
order society); Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language,
and Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1665 {1990) (arguing that societal permission for
battering and the failure to intervene in battering behavior are part of the violence); Frances
Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1497 (1983) (designating spheres as private is a public decision with public conse
quences).
.

32. See Dolores A. Donovan & Stephanie M. Wildman, ls the Reasonable Man Obso
lete? A Critical Perspective on Self-Defense and Provocation, 14 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 435,
442-450 (1981) (describing the development of the doctrines of self-defense and provocation
in the law of homicide).
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tic homicide result in blaming female victims for causing their own
death or holding them criminally responsible for the death of their at
tackers. They use examples from cases such as United States v. Paul,33
which described the female victim as dying "during a fight with her
husband."34 The authors correctly point out that this language, "died
during a fight," implies a fair fight that "unfortunately ended in acci
dental death" (p. 165). The authors claim that "[l]ack of respect for
women's well-being and autonomy underlies what is wrong with the
current law of domestic homicide" (p. 168).
It is true that women's well-being and autonomy are not respected
by the legal system. And as the authors assert, "cultural norms and
expectations"(p. 168) play a role in how legal doctrines are inter
preted. But the authors' phrasing the goal of their reasonable woman
reform in terms of women's autonomy belies their assertion that their
proposal is a radical one. Liberal legalism posits that all members of
the nation state are autonomous, equal, and independent actors. This
reasonable woman language veils the systems of privilege preventing
the realization of a legal system of equally situated members.35 By fo
cusing the discussion on reasonable behavior, the reasonable woman
standard preserves the underlying hierarchical power dynamic and
fails to name and unmask male privilege, while appearing to be a pro
gressive reform.36
Applying the reasonable woman standard to rape law, Forell and
Matthews urge "if a woman believes she was raped and a reasonable
woman would have believed the intercourse was without consent, it
was rape."37 They advocate:

33. 37 F.3d 496 (9th Cir. 1994). The authors discuss this case on page 165.
34. 37 F.3d at 497.
35. See Stephanie M. Wildman, Teaching and Learning toward Transformation - The
Role ofthe Classroom in Noticing Privilege, in PRIVILEGE REVEALED, supra note 25, at 161,
168-71 (describing how liberal legalism operates to mask the status quo of privilege).
36. For an explanation of "preservation through transformation," describing how basic
power relations are recreated and maintained using new doctrinal forms, see Reva Siegel,
Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State
Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111 (1997).
37. P. 239. In this passage Forell and Matthews seem to concede that sexual conduct
must involve heterosexual intercourse to be considered rape. Many state statutes have rede
fined the crime to include "penetration by objects," so that rape may include other sexual
behaviors beyond heterosexual intercourse. See, e.g., Cassia C. Spohn, The Rape Reform
Movement: The Traditional Common Law and Rape Law Reforms, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 119
(1999) (describing changes in rape law during the last thirty years). Spohn explains:
[T]he Michigan statute, considered to be a model rape reform law, defines sexual pene
tration as "sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any other intrusion,
however slight, of any part of a person's body or of any object into the genital or anal open
ing of another person's body, but emission of semen not required."
Id. at 122-23 (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520a (1991)).
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The law should ask whether the defendant behaved like a person who
believed he was engaged in consensual sexual activity and whether a rea
sonable woman would have behaved similarly. A reasonable woman
would not use force, intimidation, or threats of force. A reasonable
woman would not believe the sexual activity was consensual if her part
ner cried, said no, tried to leave, or otherwise resisted intercourse. . . . In
fact, a reasonable woman would want affirmative evidence of consent.

[p. 239]
The authors argue that asking these questions ensures a standard that
"embodies respect for women's autonomy, physical integrity and right
to control their sexuality" (p. 240). But, here again, the authors have
specified behaviors that exemplify criminal conduct, making the no
tion of reasonableness unnecessary. Only by making the implicit ex
plicit and by naming the system of male privilege that governs rape
law can the legal system begin not to privilege that male point of view.
Challenging action committed with the presence of "force, intimida
tion, or threats of force" (p. 239) and questioning the anti-woman use
of the consent defense in rape law will dismantle the system of male
privilege that presumes women's availability for sexual activity.
Recognizing the harms women suffer and eliciting empathy for
women in these situations remain vital objectives. But a truly radical
change would result from challenging cultural norms and expectations
by changing the dominant idea of what conduct is acceptable and what
behaviors are harmful to women. Martha Mahoney demonstrated this
power of naming by identifying separation assault as "an assault that
by its nature takes place over time,"38 every time a woman tries to
separate from her violent partner "before she finally kills her
abuser."39 Finding the words to describe women's experience, as
Mahoney did, changed the face of the battered woman's self-defense
claim, clarifying the reality of the existence of imminent danger of
death or great bodily harm. In bringing "the ghosts of dead women women slain by their abusers - into court to stand beside the woman
accused of killing an abusive spouse,"40 Mahoney did not seek a rea
sonable woman standard (though arguably the battered woman's be
havior is also reasonable). Rather by naming the harm women faced
- the separation assault - Mahoney addressed the power in the rela
tionship and exposed the privilege given to men to perpetrate their
abuse.

38. Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 83 {1991).
39. Id.
40. Id.
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V. THE SAMENESS/DIFFERENCE EQUALITY PROBLEM AND THE
REASONABLE WOMAN

Porell and Matthews' proposal to use the reasonable woman as the
measure of man is also problematic because it implicates two funda
mental problems that have continued to plague feminist thinkers: the
"sameness/difference" equality problem and the essentialism problem.
The paradigm language that constitutionally protects the notion of
equality appears in the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides in
relevant part: "No State shall . . . deny to any person within its juris
diction the equal protection of the laws. "41 This language does not re
quire a comparison mode. Yet equal protection jurisprudence has re
lied upon this comparison mode, comparing the treatment of women
to men and maintaining the status quo that privileges men.42 Early
feminist litigation in the Supreme Court urged equal access to jobs and
education by comparing women to men and asking the Court to treat
both sexes in the same manner.43 Thus the Court held that women
could be estate administrators,44 receive military benefits for their
spouses under federal law,45 and purchase 3.2% beer.46
Soon, however, the "sameness/difference" equality problem sur
faced in the debate within the feminist legal community surrounding
the treatment of pregnancy.47 In the 1980s feminist litigators sought
"to articulate a feminist vision that went beyond identical treatment to
men."48 But the theorizing of difference or accommodation or special
treatment, as this feminist vision was alternately characterized,49 pro
duced a serious schism in the feminist legal community. Opponents of
accommodation for women's workplace needs feared creating stereo41. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
42 See Stephanie M. Wildman, The Legitimation of Sex Discrimination: A Critical Re
sponse to Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 63 OR. L. REV. 265, 267-68 (1984) (urging that any
"stigmatizing conduct which inhibits the full participation of women in society should be
found unconstitutional under the equal protection clause," without regard to the treatment
of women in relation to men).
43. See MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 47
(1999); Wildman, supra note 42.
44.

See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971).

45. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690-91 (1973).
46. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 191-92, 210 (1976).
47. See CHAMALLAS, supra note 43, at 23, 26-27 (identifying the 1980s as marking the
emergence of the "Difference Stage" in feminist legal theory). This debate between same
ness and difference is also sometimes couched as equal treatment versus special treatment.
48. Id. at 47.
49. See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger & Patricia N. Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Contro
versy: Equal Treatment, Positive Action and the Meaning of Women's Equality, 13 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 513 (1983); Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL.
L. REV. 1279 {1987).
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types of women workers that would be used to keep women from the
access only so recently won.so
MacKinnon elaborates upon the critique of the comparison mode
prevalent in equality theory, explaining that two paths to equality are
allowed to women.st Women must either "be the same as men" or "be
different from men."52 MacK.innon continues:
Under the sameness standard, women are measured according to our
correspondence with man, our equality judged by our proximity to his
measure. Under the difference standard, we are measured according to
our lack of correspondence with him, our womanhood judged by our dis
tance from his measure. Gender neutrality is thus simply the male stan
dard, and the special protection rule is simply the female standard, but
do not be deceived: masculinity, or maleness, is the referent for both.53

Porell and Matthews acknowledge that a "reasonable woman stan
dard intentionally highlights difference" (p. 9). Clearly conscious of
this sameness/difference equality problem, Porell and Matthews seek
by their subtitle, "The Reasonable Woman as a Measure of Man," to
remedy the problem of male normativity by making the reasonable
woman the measure. But this linguistic exchange fails meaningfully to
address systemic male privilege and, in fact, contributes to the liberal,
legal notion that all citizens are full and equal participants in society.
The Porell and Matthews solution to the sameness/difference debate
- making woman the measure of man - contributes to the veiling of
the system of male privilege. Women and men are not fungible halves
of a gender category whose places can be simply exchanged. Even
when their places are switched, so that women are the measure of
men, femaleness still occupies a subordinate position in the prevalent
gender hierarchy that privileges maleness. Dismantling that system
involves more than flipping positions; this false notion of fungibility
simply encourages the kind of liberal legalist thinking that veils the
system of privilege.
VI.

THE ESSENTIALISM PROBLEM AND THE REASONABLE WOMAN

Porell and Matthews' proposal also cannot resolve the "essential
ism problem." The essentialism problem in feminist theory refers to
the difficulty in speaking accurately about "women" as if women fit
50. See, e.g., Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treat
ment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325 (1984-1985).
51. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimina
tion, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 32 {1987); see also
Elizabeth M. Schneider, Resistance to Equality, 57 U. PITI. L. REV. 477, 492 (1996) (de
scribing tension between equal treatment and special treatment as "especially problematic"
in cases involving battered women as defendants).
52. MACKINNON, supra note 51, at 33.
53. Id. at 34.
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some universal definition. While essentialism is a term with a number
of meanings within feminist theory,54 the term is often understood to
mean that "overgeneralizations or unstated reference points implicitly
attribute to all members of a group the characteristics of a dominant
subset of that group."55 As Katharine B artlett and Angela Harris ex
plain: "A common subject for critique is the unstated, sometimes un
conscious assumption that for purposes of feminism, 'women' are
white, middle class, heterosexual, able-bodied, and otherwise privi
leged."56 They ask whether it is possible to theorize about "women"
without "indulging" this essentialist assumption. No discussion of
gendered assumptions, whether using language of the reasonable
woman or relying on an articulation of a system of male privilege, can
escape the essentialism trap. Using essentialism strategically - trying
to avoid its pitfalls while trying to dismantle systemic privilege - and
remembering the connections between systems of privilege seem the
best available approach offered by feminist theory.57 As Harris ex
plains elsewhere:
[F]eminist theorizing about "women" must . . . be strategic and contingent, focusing on relationships, not essences . . . . [W]omen will be able to
acknowledge their differences without threatening feminism itself. In
the process, as feminists begin to attack racism and classism and homo
phobia, feminism will change from being only about "women as women"
(modified women need not apply), to being about all kinds of oppression
based on seemingly inherent and unalterable characteristics. We need
not wait for a unified theory of oppression; that theory can be femi
nism.58

The reasonable woman standard and a privilege analysis both require
recognition of context, the best method for avoiding the essentialism
trap.
54. Katharine Bartlett and Angela Harris summarize seven meanings for the term "es
sentialism," including the asswnption mentioned here, as well as "the applicability of West
ern feminism to other cultures," the view that gender oppression is "the most 'fundamental'
or 'primary' oppression," "selecting out only one possible source of a woman's identity such as her gender, race, class, or sexual preference - and treating it as severable from the
rest of her being," treating women "as a self-explanatory category, often defined by biol
ogy." Bartlett and Harris also note that the term "essentialism" implicates the problems of
categorization and perspective. See KATHARINE T. BARTLETI & ANGELA P. HARRIS,
GENDER AND LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 1007-09 (2d ed. 1998).
55. Id. at 1007.
56. Id.
57. See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, The Problem of Cultural Self-Representation, in
THE POST-COLONIAL CRITIC: INTERVIEWS, STRATEGIES, DIALOGUES 50, 51 (Sarah
Harasym ed., 1990) (interview with Walter Adamson) (discussing the need to use essential
ism strategically); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42
STAN. L. REV. 581, 612 (1990) (describing the need to be strategic in discussing the category
"woman"); see also Wildman with Davis, supra note 25, at 23 (discussing the koosh ball
metaphor for multiple identity strands).
58. Harris, supra note 57, at 612 (footnotes omitted).
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As jurisprudential critiques, both the comparison mode, implicit in
the sameness/difference debate about equality, and the essentialism
problem ignore the systems of privilege that underlie the constructed
identity categories. Whether one focuses on sex/gender and runs the
risk of essentializing by omitting discussions of race, class, sexual ori
entation, and other identity categories or whether one focuses on
equality by talking about woman as the measure of man or the meas
ure of reasonableness, these conversations mask the systems of privi
lege. The categories embodied in each identity group do not exist on
an equal plane in the social structure. Maleness is privileged over fe
maleness, heterosexuality over queerness, economic advantage over
poverty, whiteness over nonwhiteness. The path out of the same
ness/difference equality trap and the essentialism problem necessarily
travels through a discussion of systems of privilege.
MacKinnon has said she has not seen any reasonable people, only
reasonable men and reasonable women, reflecting the idea that our
lived reality is gendered.59 It is precisely this description of the differ
ent norms of reasonableness as having sexually divergent meanings
that makes the reasonable woman standard problematic and unhelpful
in achieving a vision of equality in which women are not subjugated
actors. Porell and Matthews' text is full of examples of male judges
understanding a female plaintiff's or defendant's viewpoint and female
judges who rule from a "male" perspective. Reifying a reasonable
woman standard does not get us away from the problem of who is in
terpreting that standard. Rather than leave to chance the vagaries of
such interpretation, a helpful legal standard would make explicit the
context of systemic privilege in which the decision is being made.
Such a standard might ask whether the decision fosters notions of
women as full and equal participants in society, recognizing the sys
tems of privilege that prevent the promise of equal protection of the
laws from being kept?60

59. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Sex and Violence, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED,
supra note 51, at 85, flJI ("I don't use the term persons, I guess, because I haven't seen many
lately."). Women experience the world differently than men. This statement could be
viewed as siding in the sameness/difference equality debate on the difference side. But en
tering that debate assumes a fundamental premise of legal liberalism, that everyone is an
equal actor in the nation state. MacKinnon rejects this liberal legal view. Her description of
gendered relations has been labeled "dominance theory" by several commentators. See, e.g.,
BARTLETI & HARRIS, supra note 54, at 487; MARY BECKER ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS IN FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY 68-81 (1994);
CHAMALLAS, supra note 43, at 53-62. The essentialism problem shows women also experi
ence the world differently from each other.
60. Cf. Wildman, supra note 42, at 304-07 (articulating a participatory perspective for
equal protectionjurisprudence, a precursor to a recognition of systems of privilege).
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VII. THE DIFFICULTY IN NAMING SYSTEMIC MALE PRIVILEGE
Two cases, Soto v. Flores61 and Taylor v. State,62 demonstrate the
need to identify systemic male privilege and the difficulties women
face in achieving full, equal societal participation. These cases, with
their compelling facts, illustrate a particularly egregious form of male
privilege, in which the mechanism of the state functions to reinforce
women's subjugation.
A. Soto v. Flores
In 1981 Flor Maria Soto married Angel Rodriguez ("Rafi").63
Their daughter, Sally, was born in 1983, and their son, Chayanne, was
born in 1988.64 Rodriguez began abusing Soto emotionally and physi
cally about one year into the marriage in incidents frequently con
nected to drinking.65
Rodriguez performed gardening and vehicle repair work for police
officers at the local Palmer Police Station, where he was friendly with
several officers.66 The court explained that
Rodriguez visited the station almost daily. Many of the officers, when on
patrol in the area, would visit the Rodriguez-Soto home for coffee or a
drink. [Officer] Flores and Rodriguez were particularly friendly; about
once a week, during his patrol rounds, Flores would stop by the house for
an hour's visit.67

According to the court, during nine years of domestic violence "Soto
had never sought help because she believed that the police would do
nothing, because she had nowhere to go, and because she was afraid of
Rodriguez."68 During this time, he had threatened her with a gun and
threatened to kill members of her family if she went to the police to
report his abuse.
In spite of these fears, on April 17, 1991, Soto went with her
mother and children to the police station to report a beating.69 Officer
Flores, who was on duty, summoned help, referring to Ms. Soto as
"Rafi's wife," told Soto that "he himself had domestic violence prob
lems" for which his wife wanted him jailed, and "urged Soto to patch
61. 103 F.3d 1056 (1st Cir. 1997).
62. 452 So. 2d 441 (Miss. 1984).
63. See Soto, 103 F.3d at 1058.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. Id. at 1059.
68. Id.
69. See id.
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things up with Rodriguez.mo When the supervising officer arrived to
take Soto's complaint, "[t]he door to the interview room remained
open, and Flores listened to everything that was said . . . . "71
These events took place within a society seeking to address domes
tic violence. In 1989 Puerto Rico had enacted a comprehensive anti
domestic violence law, the Domestic Abuse Prevention and Interven
tion Act, known popularly as "Law 54."72 Law 54 directs officers to
arrest the abuser in any case in which an officer has grounds to believe
the law has been violated.73 The law further requires officers to pro
vide complainants with information about social services, offer trans
portation to a safe place, transcribe a written report, ensure confiden
tiality, and explicitly states that mediation or reconciliation efforts by
police shall not substitute for arrest.74 The regulations further state:
"Domestic violence . . . frequently ends in intra-family homicide and it
affects all the components of the family, including the children."75
As the court explained, even in the face of this comprehensive le
gal framework, at the conclusion of his interview with Soto, the super
vising officer "took no action. [He] did not tell Soto about the avail
ability of battered women's shelters or about procedures for obtaining
an order of protection. Nor did he prepare a domestic violence re
port."76 He did prepare an "Other Services Report," "falsely indi
cat[ing] that Soto had visited the police solely for advice relating to
child custody."77 Soto then returned to her mother's house.
The officer who had conducted the interview discussed the com
plaint with his Sergeant. The Sergeant discussed it with Officer Flores,
who stated that "Soto and her husband had marital problems because
Rodriguez was an alcoholic."78 Flores told the Sergeant that he
[Flores] would speak to Rodriguez.79 Even though he knew that
Rodriguez had threatened to commit murder if his wife went to the
police, Flores told Rodriguez about Soto's visit to the police station.80
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 8, §§ 631-635, 638 (1996). See Jenny Rivera, Puerto Rico's Do
mestic Violence Prevention and Intervention Law and the United States Violence Against
Women Act of 1994: The Limitations of Legislative Responses, 5 COLUM. J. GENDER & L.
78 (1995) (discussing Puerto Rico's Domestic Violence Prevention and Intervention Law
(Ley 54 or Law 54)), for an in-depth analysis of the sections of this legislative scheme.
73. See Soto, 103 F.3d at 1060.
74. See id.
75. Id. (quoting regulations implementing Law 54 (alterations in original)).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See id.
80. See id.
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In a series of encounters over the next four days, Rodriguez went
to Soto's mother's house to find her, argued with Soto in a local busi
ness, took the children on a beach trip, and refused to return the chil
dren twice.81 Finally on Sunday evening, because the children had
school the next day, Soto went again to try to retrieve the children
from her husband.82 As she stood on the lawn:
Soto heard both children tell Rodriguez that she had arrived. Sally
shouted, "Run, Mommy, please run!" Rodriguez then shot his son in the
forehead. Soto heard Sally say to her father, "Daddy, no, Daddy, no."
Rodriguez then shot Sally through her mouth. Soto heard a third shot.
Rodriguez had killed himself.83

Soto filed suit alleging a violation of section 198384 which requires
conduct under color of state law that denies rights secured by the
Constitution or federal law.85 Soto alleged an equal protection viola
tion claiming: "[ d]efendants have a custom, policy and practice of
treating complaints from, or on behalf of, women threatened with
violence in domestic disputes differently from other complaints of
violence. Defendants have discriminated on the basis of the sex of the
complaining victim."86 The First Circuit followed Watson v. City of
Kansas City,81 requiring a plaintiff seeking to survive a summary judg
ment motion to:
proffer sufficient evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to infer
that it is the policy or custom of the police to provide less protection to
victims of domestic violence than to other victims. of violence, that dis
crimination against women was a motivating factor, and that the plaintiff
was injured by the policy or custom.88

The court conceded that Soto had introduced enough evidence to
raise an issue as to whether the police had a custom or policy of pro
viding less protection to domestic violence victims than to other crime
victims. But the court concluded that Soto had failed to show dis
criminatory purpose.89 The court seemed to think that Flores' actions
in talking to Rodriguez about his family situation and Soto's complaint
81. See id. at 1060-61.
82 See id. at 1061.
83. Id.
84. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) provides redress for those injured by actions committed
"under color of' state law which deprive the victim of a right, privilege, or inimunity pro
tected by the U.S. Constitution or federal statutes. See generally Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167, 171-87 (1961).
85. See Soto, 103 F.3d at 1061.
86. Id. at 1065.
87. 857 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1988).
88. Soto, 103 F.3d at 1066 (quoting Ricketts v. City of Columbia, 36 F.3d 775, 779 (8th
Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted)).
89. See id. at 1072.
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did not derive from a sex-based motive, but instead from Flores' per
sonal belief that "his friendship could provide a basis to resolve the
matter."90 The court concluded by saying that even though it found
against Ms. Soto, "we do not of course condone the actions and fail
ures of duties we have described. The deaths of children, which may
have followed from risks arguably created by the actions of public of
ficials, are very serious matters."91
Soto provides another shocking illustration of gendered views of
reality. This setting, in which the court dismisses a man's friendship
network as personal, separate, and distinct from sex discrimination or
discriminatory purpose, illustrates the kind of scenario that most con
cerns Forell and Matthews. These "settings where men's and women's
life experiences and views on sex and aggression diverge" (p. xvii) and
where the children, Soto, and her relatives are "overwhelmingly the
injured parties" (p. xvii) are sites where male privilege is contested.
Forell and Matthews urge the reasonable woman standard as a solu
tion to bring women's perspectives to the fore. Would a "reasonable
jury" with a woman's perspective find the requisite intent to discrimi
nate against women as a motivating factor?92 Would a judge with the
perspective of a reasonable woman find that intent?
Reasonable men or women might well find discriminatory intent
on these facts. The author of the Soto opinion, Judge Sandra Lynch,93
however, found no discriminatory intent as a matter of law. Asking
her to examine the question of discriminatory intent from the perspec
tive of a reasonable woman seeking autonomy seems redundant. As a
judicial nominee of a Democratic president, she is a likely candidate
for possessing views that coincide with a reasonable woman. In her
own career she has sought to combat gender bias.94 Yet her life expe
riences did not lead to a finding of sex discrimination in this case.
Could a privilege analysis help? If equal protection means not
maintaining male privilege and ensuring women can be full societal
90. Id. at 1070.
91. Id. at 1072.
92. Much has been written on the poverty of the intent requirement in anti·
discrimination law. Charles Lawrence and Linda Krieger have argued persuasively from
different psychoanalytic theories that the human mind functions to defend itself and catego·
rize in ways that make the intent requirement impossible to meet. See Linda Hamilton
Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and
Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995); Charles R. Lawrence III,
The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L.
REV. 317 (1987).
93. 103 F3d at 1058. Judge Lynch was appointed by President Clinton in 1994. See
Judy Rakowsky, Lawyer Set for Breyer Vacancy; Lynch to Be First Woman on Circuit,
BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 14, 1994, at 33 (detailing Lynch's legal career from activist law stu
dent to her role tackling gender bias in the court system as president of the Boston Bar
Association).
94. See id.
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participants, then Soto's right to equal protection was violated. These
male actors are not simply private men, buddies getting together to
complain about women and the domestic violence act. They are also
police officers, the representatives of the state, and they act in that ca
pacity to undermine the law and maintain male privilege. Naming the
harm Ms. Soto suffered by the police refusal to take her claim seri
ously or to take Law 54 seriously, despite its language directed at such
violent situations, confronts a system of state permission for domestic
abuse. The gendered nature of the harm is apparent and systemic, not
accidental.

B.

Taylor v. State

Mary Alice Taylor is serving a life sentence in Mississippi after
being tried and convicted of murder. Ms. Taylor was fourteen years
old when she shot and killed Mrs. Maple Markham. Stating that the
trial provided the jury with a detailed description of Ms. Taylor's life
leading up to the homicide, the Mississippi Supreme Court offered the
following description of the record:
Mary, an unwed teenaged mother, arrived in Greenwood, Mississippi,
with her infant son on October 15, 1980. As she was unable to properly
care for the child, the Leflore County Court, acting ex parte, and without
notice to the appellant, temporarily placed the child in the custody of the
Leflore County Welfare Department. On December 21, 1980, Mrs.

Maple Markham came to the lodgings of Mary Taylor and took the child
from her custody. So began the relationship between these two that has
led us to this place.
The baby was placed in a foster home, but Mary Taylor did have visi
tations with the baby which were arranged for her by Mrs. Markham, as
the case worker assigned to the case. These visits were terminated on
February 24, 1981, when the County Court made permanent the original
temporary order of removal.
After that Mary continued to ask
Markham to let her visit her baby son, even after March, when Mary
learned that she was again pregnant. These visitation requests were de
nied by Mrs. Markham, and the relationship between the two women se
riously deteriorated.
Mary Taylor made her last effort to talk Mrs. Markham into letting
her visit her child on the day of July 19, 1981. Mary went to Markham's
office and stayed for over three hours, seeking a visit with her first born.
Her efforts were fruitless. Finally, Markham offered to drive Mary
home. While in the automobile, Markham told Mary that not only could
she not visit her child, but that as soon as the baby Mary was then carry
ing was born, that baby, too, would be removed from Mary's custody. At
this point, Mary Taylor took a pistol from her purse and shot Mrs.
Markham to death.95

95. Taylor v. State, 452 So. 2d 441, 443 (Miss. 1984) (emphasis added).
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The judge instructed the jury as to both manslaughter and murder.
The Mississippi Code96 defines manslaughter as "[t]he killing of a hu
man being without malice, in the heat of passion, but in a cruel or un
usual manner, or by the use of a dangerous weapon, without authority
of law, and not in necessary self-defense."97 Murder, however, must be
committed with malice aforethought.98
Ms. Taylor appealed from the guilty verdict of murder alleging er
ror in the exclusion of the testimony of psychologists as to her state of
mind. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed her conviction, finding
that the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony as to Ms. Taylor's
state of mind was appropriate. The experts would have testified that
"because of her state of mind, Mary Taylor's crime could not have
been murder, but was manslaughter."99 The court rejected the prof
fered expert testimony as subjective, stating that "the question of
whether a defendant acted without malice and in the heat of passion is
an objective one."100 The court evaluated the elements that would re
duce a killing to manslaughter in terms of a reasonable provocation
and whether a "reasonable man [sic] so provoked would not have
cooled off. "101
Reasonable provocation is a term that is gender neutral on its face,
presumably permitting women as well as men to be reasonably pro
voked. Forell and Matthews maintain that it is a "bizarre kind of
equality" (p. 177) that would allow women to claim the defense of pas
sion/provocation for homicides. The authors believe that this solution
is a "false and perverse equality" because "women almost never kill
their intimates out of jealousy or anger about rejection" (p. 177).
Passion/provocation remains a troubling defense. Reasonable men
and reasonable women arguably do not kill. But the defense exists as
a safety valve within the criminal justice system to recognize human
weakness and loss of control.102 The defense does not seek to condone

96. Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-35 {1994).
97. Taylor, 452 So. 2d at 443 {quoting MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-35).
98. See id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 449.
101. Id. at 447.
102. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 191
{William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1992) {1769) ("[T]he law pays that regard to human frailty, as
not to put a hasty and a deliberate act upon the same footing with regard to guilt.");
Glanville Williams, Provocation and the Reasonable Man, 1954 CRIM. L. REV. 740, 742
(noting that "the true view of provocation is that it is a concession to 'the frailty of human
nature' in those exceptional cases where the legal prohibition fails of effect"); and Rachel J.
Littman, Adequate Provocation, Individual Responsibility, and the Deconstruction of Free
Will, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1127, 1155-56 {1997) {"The entire heat-of-passion doctrine relies on
the assumptions that (1) ordinary, reasonable people can be adequately provoked to violent
behavior by external factors, and (2) the violent act is an uncontrolled response.").
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homicidal behavior, but to acknowledge that different degrees of
criminal conduct and culpability do exist. Women may rarely kill over
jealousy or anger over sexual rejection, as the authors explain. But if
any circumstances might lead a woman to homicide in a situation
driven by heat of passion so that a provocation defense should be
available to a woman, then the facts surrounding Mary Alice Taylor's
crime exemplify them. Forell and Matthews' reasonable woman seeks
respect and autonomy, but in this situation, Ms. Taylor has had those
values trampled upon by the state's removal of her child without a
hearing. Faced with the new threat of removal of her unborn child,
the fourteen-year-old Ms. Taylor lost control of her emotions.
We can only speculate as to whether a jury instructed with a rea
sonable woman standard would have reached a verdict other than one
finding Ms. Taylor guilty of murder. Elizabeth Schneider has com
mented on the resistance in the battered women's cases to female de
fendants receiving equal rights to trial without gender bias. Schneider
identifies this failure as based in "a national chord of anxiety about
'abuse excuse' justice."103 "[G]ender bias," she notes, "operates in
these cases in both overt and subtle ways . . . ."104 Schneider's observa
tions apply to Mary Alice Taylor's prosecution and conviction as well.
Schneider urges that "the particular facts and circumstances of each
case must be evaluated in light of the general problem of gender-bias
in order to ensure an individual woman's equal rights to trial."105
Mary Alice Taylor's conviction, whether under a reasonable man or
woman instruction, illustrates this "resistance to reasonableness."106 In
the context of criminal prosecutions, an emphasis on the particular
facts and circumstances of each case is especially appropriate because
the issue is individual criminal culpability in the face of an established
societal norm prohibiting homicide. Where the societal norm is clear,
reasonableness in violating that norm is a useful inquiry that relates to
criminal culpability. Here the context of the particular circumstances
- the state action removing her child and threatening to seize the
next one - must be considered in evaluating reasonableness.
Ms. Taylor was an African-American unwed mother, still a child
herself.107 She was thirteen when her first child was born; the father
103. Schneider, supra note 51, at 482.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 487. Like the use of the "reasonable woman," the term "gender bias" fails to
focus on the systemic nature of male power and privilege that enables the system of gender
bias to continue. Schneider acknowledges "the broader problems of gender subordination"
necessary to understanding the problem of battering. Id. at 495.
106. Id. at 503. Schneider identifies this resistance to reasonableness in the dispute over
the appropriate standard in the sexual harassment cases. See id.
107. See Court Reporter's Transcript of Testimony of Witnesses at 152 (Circuit Court of
Washington County, Mississippi, April, 1982 Term), Taylor (No. 54183) (on file with Profes
sor Martha Mahoney, University of Miami School of Law).
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was thirty-seven. She needed more than a reasonable woman stan
dard in a jury instruction to emphasize the context in which her ac
tions occurred. She needed a society that values caregiving108 and sup
ports single mothers.109 She needed more care provided for herself
during her adolescence. She needed a jury who could recognize the
racialized world she inhabits and in which her actions took place.110
She needed jury instructions that address racism. It is unlikely that
her jury would value the relationship between this single African
American mother and her children without an explanation of the sys
tems of privilege in which Ms. Taylor's actions occurred.
In the criminal law setting, a reasonableness standard, even when
gendered female, does not go far enough to reveal the social reality in
which the criminal conduct occurred. In a setting such as the work
place where the societal norm is evolving, the reasonableness standard
provides insufficient guidance. The lens of reasonableness may be ac
tually harmful in a case like Soto, where the norm of family dynamics
is also contested. The police believed that a reasonable woman would
return to her husband. Soto illustrates the nightmare for women of a
world in which male privilege is reinforced by state action. One goes
to the police for protection.111 If that avenue is foreclosed, the state
enables male privilege to function unchecked. Taylor, too, presented
a scenario in which the state functioned to maintain patriarchal values.
The social worker acted on behalf of the state "ex parte and without
notice,"112 removing Ms. Taylor's child from her lodging, and taking
the child into state custody. Even the court, an arm of the state,
speaks of Ms. Taylor as "Mary," while the social worker is named the
honorific "Mrs." Linguistically, Mrs. Markham's married position
placed her in a role of superiority to "Mary's" unwed-mother status.
In this hierarchical landscape, Ms. Taylor's needs cannot be met by a
resort to reasonableness.
108. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE
SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER T\VENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 9 (1995) ("[A]s a society,
we do not value caretaking or caretakers . . . . ).
"

109. See generally Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 Wrs. L. REV. 539; Dorothy E.
Roberts, Punishing Dmg Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the
Right ofPrivacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419 (1991).
110. See PAUL HARRIS, BLACK RAGE CONFRONTS TIJE LAW (1997) (emphasizing the
need for the judicial system to recognize the social reality of defendants). "[T]he black rage
defense educates the judge and jury about society's role in contributing to the criminal act."
Id. at 5; see also Donovan & Wildman, supra note 32 (urging the need to address the social
reality of defendants in self-defense and provocation cases).
111. See, e.g., Riss v. City of New York, 240 N.E. 2d 860 (N.Y. 1968). Linda Riss was
also a woman in a battering relationship, threatened when she tried to separate. Her abusive
boyfriend hired a thug who scarred her with lye after the police declined to provide her with
protection. See David A. Andelman, Woman Married to Ex-Lawyer who Hired Thugs to
Blind Her, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1974, at Al, cited in JOHN W. WADE ET AL., PROSSER,
WADE & SCHWARTZ'S CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 629 (9th ed. 1994).
112. Taylor, 452 So. 2d at 443.
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The Soto case illustrates the poverty of the sameness/difference
problem in equality theory which relies on a comparison model to find
discrimination. In the domestic violence context, no mirror image
comparison exists; the police conduct cannot be compared to other
corresponding situations. Unable to make the comparison, the court
fails to find a sex discriminatory purpose. The Taylor case exemplifies
the essentialism problem in feminist theory. Ms. Taylor is a woman,
but her race, age, and economic status, as well as her gender, all con
tributed to the tragic events that unfolded. Focusing on the gender
portion of her identity can only begin to explain the circumstances that
led to her murder conviction.
CONCLUSION
A Law of Her Own: The Reasonable Woman as a Measure of Man
presents a readable summary of the gendered issues in sexual harass
ment, stalking, domestic homicide, and rape. The authors advocate
that the legal system adopt a reasonable woman standard in these ar
eas to ensure that harms to women are recognized. The use of a rea
sonable woman standard, however, cannot sufficiently challenge the
status quo that ignores those harms. In the end, the tensions gener
ated by the sameness/difference equality problem and the essentialism
problem remain unresolved. An analysis beyond the reasonable
woman that recognizes systems of privilege, particularly male privi
lege, is necessary to truly give woman a law of her own.

